Agefi Luxembourg - septembre 2026

AGEFI Luxembourg 26 Septembre 2026 Fonds &Marchés By Dr. Sebastiaan HOOGHIEMSTRA, senior associateintheinvestmentmanagementpractice of Loyens&Loeff Luxembourg. R egulation (EU) 2019/1238 (“PEPP 1.0”) was adopted in 2019 and is applicable since 22 March 2022. Till now, the uptake of PanEuropeanPensionProducts (“PEPPs”) is disappointing. For that purpose, the European Commission (“EC”) published on 20November 2025 a proposal to amendPEPP 1.0 (“PEPP 2.0 Proposal”). This contribution discusses the PEPP 2.0 froma privatemarkets’ perspective. ThePEPP2.0Proposalrepresentsthemostsignificant rethinkingof thePEPPframework since its introduc­ tion in 2019. The proposal removes several of the structuralbarriersthathavepreventedthePEPPfrom becomingacommerciallyviablepensionproductand openlyacknowledgesthatPEPP1.0hasfailedtogain meaningful market traction. At the end of 2025, only twoproviderswereactiveacrosstheEuropeanUnion. Manyof the criticisms raisedbymarket participants have been addressed. The EC proposes, amongst others, to remove the1%fee cap, abolish themanda­ tory subaccount regime, introduce workplace PEPPswithemployercontributions,permitautoen­ rolment arrangements and replace burdensome guarantee structures for the Basic PEPP with life­ cycle investment strategies. Froma commercial per­ spective, the PEPP 2.0 Proposal is therefore a substantial improvement. Yet, despite these mean­ ingful improvements, the proposal leaves one fun­ damental question unanswered. If the Savings and InvestmentsUnion (“ SIU ”) is in­ tended tomobilize longtermretail savings towards productive investment, why does the revisedPEPP continue to treat private markets as an exception rather thanas a core component of longtermretire­ ment investing? In that respect, PEPP2.0mayultimately riskbecom­ ing little more than an expensive UCITS wrapper rather than Europe’s flagship longterm retirement investment product. FromPensionPolicy toCapitalMarkets Policy One of the most striking elements of the PEPP 2.0 Proposal is the EC’s explicit positioning of the PEPP within the broader SIU agenda. The explanatorymemorandumof thePEPP2.0Pro­ posal repeatedly emphasizes that pension reform is not solely about retirement adequacy. Supplemen­ tarypensions are also viewed as amechanismto re­ allocate household savings from lowyield deposits towards productive longterm investment. The EC explicitly links PEPP reform to the Draghi Report, theLettaReport,theSIUandtheneedtosupportEu­ ropeancompetitiveness, innovationandstrategic in­ vestmentpriorities.Thisreflectsanimportantshift in political thinking. Historically, supplementary pensions were pri­ marily regarded as social policy instruments. Today, theyare increasinglyviewedaspart of Eu­ rope’s economic strategy. Longtermpension sav­ ings can finance infrastructure, technology, energy transition projects, venture capital andprivatebusinesseswhile simulta­ neously improving retirement out­ comes. Viewed through that lens, PEPP should not merely be a pension product. It should be Europe’s flagship retail longterm invest­ ment product. PEPP 1.0: AProduct NobodyWanted PEPP 1.0 attempted to reconcile several policy objec­ tives simultaneously, including investor protection, portability,taxneutralityandproductstandardization across Member States. The resulting framework im­ posed significant operational constraints, including the 1% fee cap, mandatory advice requirements and mandatory subaccounts. These features reduced commercialattractiveness,particularlyforassetman­ agers that had little incentive to enter the market. Meanwhile, incumbent insurers and pension pro­ viders had limited commercial incentives to launch productsthatmightcompetewiththeirexistingoffer­ ings.PEPP1.0thereforestruggledtoestablishitselfas a viable panEuropean retirement savings product. PEPP 2.0GetsManyThings Right The EC deserves credit for listening to market feedback. Theremovalofthefeecap,amongstothers,addresses one of the most frequently cited barriers to market entry. Likewise, replacing hard guarantees for the BasicPEPPoptionwithlifecycleinvestmentstrategies constitutesanimportantmodernizationoftheframe­ work. The proposal also removes the obligation for providersofferingtailoredPEPPstodistributeaBasic PEPP and abolishes the requirement to maintain at least twonational subaccounts. Furthermore, the introduction of workplace PEPPs and employer contributions may prove to be one of themostimportantreformsintheentirepackage.Ex­ perience from jurisdictions, such as theUnitedKing­ dom,AustraliaandNewZealand, demonstrates that participationratesincreasedramaticallywherework­ place contributions andautoenrolmentmechanisms are used. Similar observationswere already reflected inprevious EIOPAStaffPaper. Theproposalalsoaddressesanothermajorweakness of PEPP 1.0: tax treatment. The EC now proposes to requireMember States togrant PEPPs treatment that is not less favourable than comparable national per­ sonalpensionproductsdirectlybymeanstheupdated PEPPregulation,ratherthanbythecurrentlyexisting Tax Recommendation accompanying PEPP 1.0. Whether this survives the legislative process remains tobeseen,buttheproposalcorrectlyidentifiesencod­ ing tax treatment throughabindingEUregulationas a critical success factor. Taken together, these reforms significantly improve the prospects for PEPPadoption. The PrivateMarkets Contradiction Perhaps themost interesting aspect of the proposal is also its greatest weakness. Throughout the PEPP 2.0 Proposal’sexplanatorymemorandum,theECargues that supplementary pensions should help mobilise longtermsavingsandsupportproductiveinvestment in the European economy. The proposal explicitly highlightstheroleofpensionsinfinancingbusinesses, the green transition and innovation. Yet the Basic PEPP remains subject to a highly restrictive invest­ ment framework. Under theproposal, at least 95%of assetsmust be in­ vested in financial instruments eligible under the MiFIDexecutiononlyregime,effectivelylimitingthe scopeforilliquidandprivatemarketinvestments.Ex­ posure toalternativeassets remains limited toa small allocationthatmaynotexceed5%oftheportfolio.This creates a conceptual inconsistency. TheECcorrectlyobservesthatpensioninvestingisin­ herently longterm. PEPP savers may invest for decadesbefore retirement. Such investment horizons are precisely what make pension products particu­ larlysuitableforinvestmentsininfrastructure,private equity, private debt and venture capital. Yet PEPP2.0 continues to treat these asset classes largely as an ex­ ception. The irony is difficult to ignore. At the very moment Europe seeks to channel household savings towards productive investment and strengthen the SIU, it restricts the product specifically designed for longtermretirementinvestingfromallocatingmean­ ingfully to longtermassets. This concern has also been raised by the European Fund and Asset Management Association (“ EFAMA ”) in its draftposition on the EC’s package on supplementary pensions. While generally sup­ portive of the broader pension package, EFAMAar­ gues that the proposed 95% requirement leaves insufficientroomforexposuretounlistedandilliquid assets despite the longterm nature of pension sav­ ings. EFAMA further notes that the French Plan d’Épargne Retraite (“PER”) permits savers to choose an overall risk profile (prudent, balanced, dynamic, or offensive) that determines how contributions are allocated across various asset classes. Inpractice, this meansprudentprofilestypicallyallocate2–6%topri­ vateorunlistedassets,whileoffensiveprofilescanal­ locate up to 15%, depending on the investment horizon andmanagement strategy. Thecomparisoniscompelling.Ifnationalpensionsys­ tems are comfortable allowing materially higher ex­ posure to private assets, it becomes increasingly difficult to explain why a supposedly modern pan­ Europeanretirementproductshouldremainsubstan­ tiallymore restrictive. That said, it remains to be seen howaccommodating the future frameworkwill ulti­ mately be towards private markets. Whilst the Level 1 PEPP 2.0 proposal expressly requires lifecycle in­ vestingfortheBasicPEPPandcontemplatesexposure to longterm investments with illiquid characteristics during the accumulation phase, significant elements of the regime remaindependent upon future Level 2 measures. Inparticular,itwillbenecessarytoassesswhetherthe future RTS on riskmitigation techniques for tailored PEPPs and lifecycle investing, aswell as any accom­ panying Delegated Regulation, permit meaningful exposure to alternative assets throughout substantial partsoftheaccumulationphaseorwhethertheresult­ ing framework will, in practice, remain largely con­ fined to traditional listed assets. Similarly, it remains tobeseenwhethertailoredPEPPswillprovidemate­ riallygreaterflexibilityforprivatemarketinvestments thantheBasicPEPPorwhetherfutureLevel2require­ ments will de facto constrain alternative asset expo­ sure across bothproduct categories. AnExpensiveUCITS? Thisraisesabroaderquestionaboutthefutureidentity of PEPP. What exactly differentiates the Basic PEPP from existing retail products? After the removal of guaranteesandtheintroductionoflifecycleinvesting, theBasicPEPPincreasinglyresemblesalongtermdi­ versifiedinvestmentportfoliocombinedwithpension taxbenefits.However,becauseofthehighlyrestrictive investment rules, the investable universe remains dominated by traditional listed securities. The result is a product that may eventually look very similar to a UCITSbased targetdate fund with additional Eu­ ropeanpension regulation layeredon top. Thatoutcomewouldbeunfortunate.Europealready possesses an extremely successful retail investment product in the formofUCITS. Thesemayunder var­ ious Member State laws already be embedded into supplementarypensionandinsuranceproductswith tax benefits. The purpose of PEPP should be to offer somethingdifferent:aretirementproductdesignedto exploit theunique characteristics of longterminvest­ ing.Thatshouldincludemeaningfulaccesstoprivate marketswhere appropriate. Conclusion PEPP2.0 is unquestionably superior toPEPP1.0. The EChas addressedmanyof themost significant barri­ erstomarketadoption.Theremovalofthefeecap,the simplification of investment structures, optional sub­ accounts, workplace PEPPs and improved tax treat­ mentrepresentsubstantialprogress.Nevertheless,the proposalremainssurprisinglycautiouswhenitcomes toprivatemarkets. ThecentralpromiseoftheSIUistoconnectlongterm savings with longterm investment opportunities. Pensionproductsarearguablythemostnaturalvehi­ clethroughwhichtoachievethisobjective.Yetthere­ vised PEPP continues to treat private assets as an exception rather than as a potential feature. The EChas largely solvedPEPP’s supplyside prob­ lems. The next question is whether legislators are willing to address the investment side of the equa­ tion. If theyarenot, PEPP2.0 risks becomingabetter pension wrapper, but not the transformative long­ terminvestmentproductEuropeappearstobeseek­ ing.And that may ultimately be the greatest missed opportunity of all. PEPP2.0: Europe’s Missed Private Markets Opportunity? É nergie, industrie et res­ sources : la transition écolo­ gique ouvre un nouveau cycle mondial d’investissement. Par Ken VanWEYENBERG, Head of Client PortfolioManagement Equity, Candriam La transition écologique entre dans une nouvelle phase, davantage portée par le déploiement des capitaux, plutôt quepar l’ambition politique. Après des années de sousinvestissement dans l’énergie, l’industrie et les infrastructures de res­ sources, gouvernements et entreprises doivent reconstruire une partie de l’éco­ nomie physique. Électrification, efficacité des ressources et résilience de l’eau nécessitent des investissements à grande échelle, dessi­ nant un nouveau supercycle mondial d’investissement. Contrairement auxphases antérieuresde la transition, ce cycle d’investissement n’est plus uniquement porté par les sub­ ventionsoulesengagementsclimatiques. Alors que les solutions environnemen­ tales deviennent plus compétitives en termes de coûts et que les contraintes en matièrede ressources s’intensifient, l’éco­ nomie justifie de plus en plus l’investis­ sement à elle seule. Environ 5 trillions de dollars ont été déployés à l’échelle mon­ dialedanslesinfrastructuresdetransition énergétiqueentre2020et2024 (1) ,lesinves­ tissements devant encore s’accélérer au cours de la prochaine décennie. Un cycle d’investissement plus large Les énergies renouvelables restent au cœur de la transition, mais le cycle d’in­ vestissement s’étend désormais bien audelà de la production d’électricité ellemême : L’électrification nécessite de nouvelles infrastructures de réseau, des équipe­ ments électriques, des systèmes de stockage et des technologies d’efficacité. La circularité nécessite des investisse­ ments dans le recyclage, l’automatisation industrielle et les systèmes de gestion des déchets. Lasécuritédel’eaunécessiteletraitement, le transport, la réduction des fuites, les réseaux intelligents et les technologies de réutilisation. Ces systèmes sont de plus en plus inter­ connectés:lahaussedelademanded’élec­ tricité impose de développer et moderni­ ser les réseaux ; les contraintes sur les res­ sourcespoussent les entreprises àamélio­ rer l’efficacité des matériaux ; la pénurie d’eau accroît le besoin de systèmes rédui­ santlaconsommationetfavorisantlerecy­ clage. Ce cycle doit donc être appréhendé comme une réallocation du capital entre les fondations de l’économiemondiale. De la pression environnementale à la performance opérationnelle Le cycle des dépenses d’investissement modifie également la manière dont les entreprisesperçoiventlesinvestissements environnementaux. Les mesures qui étaient auparavant traitées principale­ ment comme des coûts de conformité sont de plus en plus considérées comme des sources d’efficacité, de résilience et d’avantage concurrentiel. Les entreprises qui adoptent des proces­ sus économes en énergie, des modèles économiques circulaires ou des techno­ logies économes en eau peuvent réduire les coûts des intrants, limiter le risque lié à la chaîne d’approvisionnement et amé­ liorer la continuité opérationnelle. Ceci est particulièrement pertinent dans les secteurs où un accès fiable à l’électricité, aux matériaux ou à l’eau devient une contrainte stratégique. Pourquoi la sélection active estelle importante ? Toutes les entreprises exposées à la transi­ tion n’en bénéficieront pas de la même manière. Comme lors des précédents cyclesd’investissementdanslesinfrastruc­ tures et l’industrie, le positionnement concurrentieletladisciplineenmatièrede capitalsontsusceptiblesdedéterminerles sources de valeur. Nous pensons que les opportunités les plus attrayantes devraient se trouver dans les entreprises qui combinent une demande structurelle et des fondamen­ taux solides : solutions évolutives, leader­ ship technologique, pouvoir de fixation desprix,barrièresàl’entréeélevéesetges­ tion disciplinée du bilan. Dans certains domaines, la croissance devrait provenir de l’accélération de l’in­ vestissement.Dansd’autres,lavaleurpeut provenir de la résilience des marges, des revenus récurrents ou des contrats d’in­ frastructure à long terme. Unmoteur d’investissement à long terme La transition écologique n’est plus seu­ lement une questiond’ambition. Il s’agit de plus en plus de mise en œuvre. Les systèmes énergétiques doivent être reconstruits, les processus industriels doivent devenir plus efficaces et les infrastructures de ressources doivent être modernisées. Cela crée un cycle d’investissement de plusieurs décennies avec de larges implications pour l’allo­ cation du capital. Pour les investisseurs à long terme, le supercycle des dépenses d’investisse­ ment représente une opportunité d’ali­ gner les portefeuilles sur la transforma­ tion physique de l’économiemondiale et d’identifierlesentrepriseslesmieuxposi­ tionnées pour y parvenir. 1) Source : Agence internationale de l’énergie, World EnergyOutlook 2025 ; analyse de Candriam Transition écologique : le temps de l’investissement ©Pexels