Agefi Luxembourg - octobre 2026

AGEFI Luxembourg 20 Octobre 2026 Marchés &Wealth ByAminBOUAZZA,Counsel,DLAPiper,Luxembourg F ormuchof the past decade, strong fundraising, rising asset values and readily available liquidityhelped contain tensions thatmight otherwise have developed intodisputes.Where perfor­ mance remained strong and exits couldbe achieved, disagreements between fundmanagers (1) and in­ vestors couldoftenbe resolved commercially. The environment has become more difficult. Longer holding pe­ riods, fewer exits, valuation uncer­ taintyandgreaterinvestorscrutinyare putting pressure on relationships across privatemarkets.Inourexperience,thisisnot only leading to more disputes but also changing the issues aroundwhich theydevelop. Fund disputes rarely start with a formal claim. More often, ordinary features of the relationship gradually become contentious. A capital call is questioned.An investor asks for the documents be­ hind an explanation. Concerns over valuation de­ velop into concerns over liquidity. Governance procedures which previously attracted little atten­ tion are examinedmore closely. Afund relationship often enters a predispute phase whencooperationgiveswaytoverificationandcom­ mercial discussion gives way to the strict exercise of legalrights.Atthatpoint,proceduralordocumentary issues which once appeared technical can become central to the parties’respective positions. Fivewarning signs tend to recur. 1. Routine notices come under legal scrutiny Capital calls are a good example. In normal circumstances, a drawdown notice is largely an operational matter. When the relationship starts to deteriorate, investors may begin to ask whetherthecallwasmadebythepersonorbodywith therequisiteauthorityunderthefunddocumentation andforapermittedpurpose.Theymayalsoquestion whether the relevant commitment remained callable atthetimeandwhethertheapplicableproceduralre­ quirementswere followed. Similar questions can arise around distributions, re­ demptions, extensions of the fund term or other re­ curring fund mechanics. The scrutiny may become more acutewhere amanager seeks to invoke default provisions or other contractual remedies, since the consequencescanbesignificantandstrictcompliance with the funddocumentation is likely to be tested. Once a party starts testing whether a routinely exer­ cised power was available in the circumstances and validlyexercised,theissueisnolongermerelyopera­ tional. Formal requirements, notice periods, contrac­ tual time limits and the allocation of authority under the fund documents may then take on a significance whichwas not apparent when the relevant stepwas first taken.Adefectmay later affect the enforceability of a notice, the availability of a remedy or the leverage available to one side in the dispute. 2. Explanations are no longer accepted without supportingdocuments Requestsforinformationareanormalfeature of the relationship between fund man­ agers and investors. The position becomesmoresensitivewhenexpla­ nations are no longer regarded as sufficient. An investormay, for example, asknot only why a capital call was made, but for the underlying calculations and de­ tails of previous drawdowns. Questions aboutportfolioperformancemayleadtore­ quests for valuation materials or board records. Concerns about a particular deci­ sionmayresultinrequestsforevidenceoftheauthor­ ity under which it was taken.At that point, the focus hasshiftedfromunderstandingthedecisiontotesting the basis onwhich itwasmade. At the same time, the scope of an investor’s informa­ tionrightsmayitselfbecomecontentious.Thoserights may derive not only from the fund documentation andsideletters,butalsofromLuxembourgcompany law. Their scope may nevertheless have to be recon­ ciledwith confidentiality obligations and thirdparty rights. The question is thereforenot onlywhether the fund manager can substantiate its position, but also what information the investor is legally or contractu­ ally entitled to receive. The documentary record may then matter as much as the substantiveexplanation. The relevant decision­ makersshouldconsiderwhetherthefunddocumen­ tation, corporate or committee records, investor communicationsandtheactualdecisionmakingpro­ cess are consistentwithone another. The same is true where conflicts of interest are involved. If a decision concerns relatedparties, competing investor interests or an exercise of discretion, the contemporaneous recordofhowtheissuewasidentified,consideredand addressedmaylaterbecomepartofthedisputeitself. 3. Valuation concerns become liquidity concerns Valuation is an obvious area of sensitivity in private markets.Itaffectsreportedperformanceand,depend­ ing on the structure, the economics of redemptions, restructuringsandexits.Inpractice,valuationdisputes often becomemore serious when they coincidewith concerns about liquidity. In closedended funds, in­ vestorsmayquestionwhy assets continue tobe held, why the life of the fund is beingextendedorwhether aproposedcontinuationor secondary transactionre­ flectsfairvalue.Thefundmanagermayconsiderthat holding an asset for longer will maximise returns, while some investorsmayprefer an earlier exit. In openended funds, the issue can crystallise more abruptly.Concernsoverthecalculationorsuspension of NAV, or restrictions on or suspensions of redemp­ tions, can bring valuation and liquidity questions to­ gether immediately. None of those measures is necessarilyimproper.Asuspensionmaybeexpressly permitted by the fund documentation and justified by the circumstances. The difficulty arises when in­ vestors begin to question whether the relevant con­ tractual conditions were met, whether the valuation process remained reliable or whether they are being prevented from realising their investment on a basis which is properly supported. The resulting dispute is therefore often not simply about whether a valuation is “right”. It may concern whether the agreed valuation process was followed, whether the underlying assumptions were support­ able, whether the relevant decisionmakers acted withinthescopeoftheirpowersandwhetherconflicts were appropriately addressed. 4. Investor protections become active points of contention Fund documentation typically contains a range of protections intended to regulateparticular situations during the life of the fund. Depending on the struc­ ture, these may include investor consent rights, LPACconsultationorapprovalmechanisms,conflict procedures, key person provisions, amendment thresholds, term extension mechanisms, removal rights and rights granted under side letters. For much of the life of a fund, many of these provisions mayremain largely in thebackground. Their signifi­ cance changes when investors begin to scrutinise whether the circumstances triggering them have arisen or whether the manager has complied with the conditions attached to their exercise. Aproposed termextensionmay lead investors to ex­ aminetheapplicableconsentthresholdandtheinfor­ mation on which the extension is being sought. A conflictinvolvingthemanageroranaffiliatemayraise questions as towhether thematter shouldhave been referredtotheLPACandwhethertheprescribedpro­ cess was followed. Akey person event, amendment to the fund documentation or exercise of a removal right may give rise to similar questions as to trigger events, voting thresholds, procedural requirements and the consequences of noncompliance. Side letters can add another layer. Rights granted to individual investorsmaydiffer fromthose contained inthemainfunddocumentation,andtheirinteraction withtheLPA,constitutionaldocumentsandarrange­ ments with other investors can become important once a dispute develops. The warning sign is therefore not that investors are seeking toparticipate in thedaytodaymanagement ofthefund.Itisthatprotectionswhichweredesigned tooperate at specificpoints in the fund’s life arebeing actively tested, invoked or challenged. At that stage, thedisputemayturnonrelativelytechnicalquestions: whether a contractual trigger occurred, whether the correctinvestorswereconsulted,whethertherequired majoritywas obtained, whether a conflict procedure wasproperlyfollowedorwhetheraninvestorspecific right modifies the position under the principal fund documents. Those issues canmateriallyaffect theva­ lidity of the step taken and the rights and remedies available to the parties. 5. Communications become litigationconscious The final warning sign is often visible in the way the parties communicate. Informal exchanges become more formal. Rights are expressly reserved. External advisersbecomeinvolved.Noticesarereviewedmore carefully and parties become increasingly conscious of how their communications and decisions would appear if the matter later came before a court or tri­ bunal. This change in behaviour often precedes any formal claim. Once litigation or arbitration becomes a realistic pos­ sibility,partiesshouldassessnotonlythemeritsofthe underlying dispute but also the procedural architec­ ture around it: contractual time bars, notice andesca­ lation requirements, governing law and jurisdiction orarbitrationprovisions,andtheavailabilityofinterim orprotectiverelief.Thisisalsothepointatwhichpro­ cedural mistakes can become difficult to correct. A misseddeadline,anincorrectlyissuednoticeoranin­ consistent explanation may later constrain the argu­ ments available to a party or give the other side additional leverage. Acommercial solution may still be possible. Indeed, earlylegalanalysiscansometimesmakeoneeasierby clarifying the parties’positions before avoidable pro­ cedural issuesmake thedisputeharder to resolve. By thatstage,however,eachpartyisalsobeginningtoas­ sess how its conduct, decisions and communications may affect its position in any future proceedings. When the relationship enters the predispute phase There is rarely one moment at which a fund dispute begins. More often, the warning signs overlap. Rou­ tine mechanics are challenged. Explanations require documentary support. Valuation concerns become linked to liquidity. Investor protections and contrac­ tual safeguards are increasingly tested. Communica­ tionsbecomemorelegalistic.Thepracticalquestionis thereforenotsimplywhetheraclaimhasalreadybeen threatened. It is whether the parties are still trying to solve the same commercial problem or have started building competing legal positions around it. At that stage, the available strategymay extendwell beyond litigation or arbitration. Depending on the fundstructureanditsdocumentation,investorsmay consider exercising contractual rights relating to the removal or replacement of the general partner or manager, termination of the investment period, re­ fusal of an extension, or, inmore serious cases, liqui­ dation of the fund. Other situations may be better addressed through a negotiated restructuring, sec­ ondary transaction or agreed exit. Thosemechanisms shouldnot be viewed as purely commercial alternatives to proceedings. Their availability will usually depend on specific con­ tractual triggers, voting thresholds andprocedural requirements, and their exercisemay itself become contentious. Earlylegalinterventionthereforeservestwopurpos­ es: preserving the ability tobringor defenda claimif necessary, while identifyingwhether the funddocu­ mentation offers a more effective route to resolve or reshape the relationship before formal proceedings become inevitable. 1)Inthisarticle,“fundmanager”isusedasageneraltermtorefertothe personorentityresponsibleforthemanagementoroperationofthefund, which may include, depending on the structure, the general partner, alternative investment fund manager, investment manager or another managemententity. Five early warning signs of a fund dispute Une chronique signée Stéphanie HENG (portrait), politologue et experte en communication, ancienne Visiting Fellow à l’ORF (Observer Research Foun­ dation, New Delhi), et Alban de La SOUDIERE, polytechnicien, fonctionnaire international émérite* C e n’est pas encore une révolution monétaire.Mais c’est un changement réel peut­ être aussi important. Pendant des décennies, le dollar a été le lubrifiant du commercemondial. Pétrole, gaz, matières premières, la plupart des échanges internatio­ naux,lesréservesdechange:partout, ou presque, le dollar s’est imposé comme la monnaie de référence. Et cette domination commerciale avait une conséquence particulièrement favorable aux ÉtatsUnis : lemonde avait besoin de dollars, qui cir­ culaientetdontunepartierevenaitacheterdeladette américaine. Ce système n’a pas disparu, loin de là, maisilestentraindes’éroder.L’expansiondesBRICS en est un symptôme très visible. La dédollarisation correspond à des flux commerciaux réels Legroupe initial constituant lesBRICS, à savoir Bré­ sil, Russie, Inde, Chine etAfriqueduSud, s’est consi­ dérablement élargi cesdernières années. Il ras­ semble désormais onze membres, auxquels s’ajoutent plusieurs pays partenaires. Leur objectif n’est pas particulièrement de créer unemonnaieunique concurrentedu dollar. De manière plus pragmatique, il s’agit de réduire la nécessité d’utiliser le dollar lorsque les deux partenaires commerciauxpeuvent régler directe­ ment dans leurs propres monnaies. Et c’est dans l’énergie que cette évo­ lutiondevient particulièrement in­ téressante. La Russie, sous sanctions occi­ dentales, a accéléré brutalement ses échanges en monnaies natio­ nales. Avec la Chine, le rouble et le yuan sont désormais au cœur des règlements commer­ ciaux. Concernant l’Inde, le pétrole russe acheté massivement par les Indiens apoussé les deuxpays àdévelopper desmécanismes de règlement en rou­ bles et en roupies, et cela parallèlement à d’autres monnaies. La Chine, de son côté, pousse méthodiquement le yuan dans ses échanges énergétiques et commer­ ciaux. Sonambitionn’est pas nonplus forcément de détrôner le dollar mais de créer suffisamment d’al­ ternatives pour que la monnaie américaine ne constitue plus un passage obligé, et limiter l’impact des sanctions. Les BRICS et la dédollarisation ne vont certes pas faire disparaître le dollar, mais ils contribuent à rendre le systèmemonétairemondial progressivement plus multipolaire. La participationde l’Europe à la diversification HorsBRICS, l’euroest déjàunemonnaiemajeurede facturation du commerce international. L’essentiel des échanges européens, y compris dans le secteur de l’énergie, s’effectue naturellement en euros. Ce­ pendant, malgré des liens privilégiés entre l’UE et ces pays, on ne peut pas dire que les importations de gaz de Norvège ou d’Algérie soient aujourd’hui systématiquement réglées en euros. De toute façon seuls certains contrats de long terme peuvent être concernés. Ces contrats sont multiples et souvent confidentiels. D’un autre coté le cours du pétrole au jour le jour, y compris la référence «Brent »deMer duNord, reste résolument coté en dollars. Néanmoins l’existence d’unemonnaie européenne capable d’assumer une partie croissante des règlements internationaux constitue bel et bien une alternative au dollar. Vers une diversificationdes réservesmondiales La dédollarisation ne signifie pas la fin prochaine du dollar, mais une diversification progressive des réserves mondiales, notamment au détriment des obligations du Trésor américains (Treasuries). Le vrai risque pour les ÉtatsUnis est que la demande étrangèrededette américaine ralentisse alorsmême que les besoins de financement explosent. Le cas norvégien est particulièrement intéressant : le 1 er septembre dernier, Norges Bank a recom­ mandé de réduire de 70%à 50%la part des obliga­ tions d’État dans l’indice de référence du fonds souverain. Cela pourrait réduire l’exposition aux Treasuries d’environ 80Md$. Ce n’est pas une déci­ sionpolitiquede « sortirdudollar » : le fonds conser­ verait une exposition importante au dollar. Mais c’est un signal intéressant. Àterme,moinsdedemande étrangère et davantage dedette signifient des tauxde refinancement poten­ tiellement plus élevés. Et quelques dizaines de points de base supplémentaires, appliqués progres­ sivement à une dette colossale, peuvent causer un cercle vicieux charge d’intérêts – déficit – dette – in­ térêts, sans négliger le risque sérieux de change et d’inflation, tant monétaire qu’importée. Le risque majeur n’est donc pas la disparition du dollar,mais lafinprogressivedufinancement amé­ ricain exceptionnellement bon marché — avec des conséquences potentiellement énormes pour les fi­ nances américaines et, par conséquent également, pour l’ensemble du système financier mondial. * Lesauteurss’exprimentàtitrepersonnel. Dédollarisation : La fin du privilège ?