Agefi Luxembourg - avril 2026

Avril 2026 31 AGEFI Luxembourg Fonds &Marchés A nother recordwas set in 2025, with global secon- dary transaction volume reaching approximately USD 226 billion - crossing the 200 billion threshold for the first time - and surpassing the previous 2024 re- cord of USD 160 billion by 41% (Evercore Private Capital Advi- sory, 2025 SecondaryMarket Report - February 2026). Thisexpansionreflectsmorethanmarket growth.Asholdingperiodslengthenand exit markets remain uneven, secondaries havemoved froma contingency solution to a core portfolio management tool. For investors and fund managers, under- standing how the market has matured and what it now demands in terms of governance and process discipline is no longer optional. Inasecondarytransaction,aninvestor acquires an existing private equity fundinterestorportfoliofromanother investor, rather than committing to a new primary investment. For sellers, this provides liquidity and portfolio rebalancing options. For buyers, it of- fers exposure to more mature assets with clearer visibility on value and cashflows.Whilethemechanicshave remained broadly consistent, the use casehasevolvedfromepisodicliquid- ity toplannedownership reallocation embedded inportfolio construction. Severalconvergingpressuresexplainwhy secondarieshaveshiftedfromopportunis- ticusetoamoreprogrammaticrole.Asthe market enters 2026, secondaries are no longer treated as ad hoc solutions de- ployed only in stressed conditions. They are increasingly integrated into portfolio management and used alongside tradi- tional exits to manage pacing, duration anddistributions. Froman exit option to an essential liquiditymanagement tool Over the past few years, a challenging Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A) envi- ronmentandamutedInitialPublicOffer- ing(IPO)markethavesloweddistribution activitycomparedtothehighsof2020and 2021.Inresponse,investorssoughtliquid- ity through secondary sales. Even when M&A and IPO windows re- open intermittently, many sponsors still face longer holding periods and uneven distributions,encouragingtheuseofGen- eral Partner–led (GP-led) transactions to managedurationandLimitedPartner–led (LP-led)salestogeneratetargetedliquidity andrebalanceportfolios.Growthhasbeen broad-based,withbothLP-ledandGP-led transactions contributing almost equally in recent years. The chart below shows how the market has scaled and how the mix has evolved. Behindtheseheadlinefigures,underlying dynamicsvarysignificantlybyassetclass. - Buyout: LP-led sales offer investors a direct route to liquidity, while GP-led continuationvehicles allowmanagers to extendownershipunder refreshed terms - offering investors a clear choice be- tween selling now or staying in for the next phase. -Privatecredit:Secondarydemandhasbe- come more consistent across vintages, making it a reliable liquidity tool regard- lessoflifecyclestage.Syndicatedloanport- folios, as part of the broader private credit market,havegainedappealonthebackof market transparencyand regular second- ary trading, offering higher liquidity and execution certainty at a time when man- agers must balance illiquid exposures against redemptionobligations. -Infrastructureandrealassets:Diversified portfoliosoftenrelyoncontinuationvehi- cles to provide orderly liquidity while preservinglong-termvalue,whereascon- centratedandrate-sensitiveexposuresare more efficiently addressed through tar- geted tender offers, allowing investors to exit selectively. - Venture and growth equity: With exit timing often extended, secondaries serve a different purpose: they are primarily used to reduce duration and simplify portfolios, rather than to capture incre- mental upside. The rise of evergreen and semi-liquidve- hicles has added another dimension to this picture and introduced a structural tension that themarket is onlybegin- ning to fully reckonwith. Unlike tra- ditional closed-end funds, evergreen structuresallowcontinuousfundrais- ingandreinvestment,creatingamore stable,cycle-resistantlayerofdemand on the buy side. Pricing has become less volatile and clearance on larger transactions has improved. Yet the growth of semi-liquid vehicles rests on a promise that is harder to keep than it appears. Periodic liquidity is rarely a feature of the underlying as- sets themselves, but of the vehicle - manufactured through cash buffers, credit lines, newsubscriptions anddistri- butions from an illiquid portfolio. When distributionsslow,thisequilibriumcomes under pressure. Managers must balance deploying capital quickly into illiquid as- sets,whichcanweakenunderwritingdis- cipline, against holding more liquid instrumentsthatreducethelong-termre- turns investors expect. The secondary market is part of the an- swer. Planned secondary transactions offer managers a governed, predictable route to generate liquidity without re- sorting to forced sales. Taken together, these dynamics explain why liquidity through secondaries has become deliberately engineered rather than improvised. The key question is no longer whether to use secondaries, but which route best fits the objective. Mar- kets that combine regulatory clarity, deep transaction expertise and strong governance are best positioned for this reality. In Europe, this ecosystem is al- ready well established, with Luxem- bourg playing a central role. Europe’s SecondaryMarket: Where StructureMeets Execution Europe has been central to this momen- tum, as evidenced by the steady flow of LP-led portfolio sales and the growing scale ofmulti-asset continuationvehicles executed across European domiciles. Within this ecosystem, Luxembourgop- erates as ahubwhere structuremeets ex- ecution.As theworld’s leadingdomicile for alternative investment funds, it brings together the legal, structuring andAIFM expertise that complex secondary trans- actions require. AIFMD passporting, alongside the clarifications introduced by ELTIF 2.0 on liquidity tools and re- demption features, enables pan-Euro- pean distribution and gives managers a credible framework to plan liquidity events through secondary transactions rather than relying on forced asset sales. Thisemphasisonstructurebecomeseven morepronouncedinGP-ledtransactions. Here, structure plays a decisive role: val- uation reference points, investor choice between selling and rolling, changes to feesor carried interest, theuseof leverage and the timing of new capital all influ- ence how a transaction ultimately prices andcloses. Thepricealone rarely tells the full story. These structural variables are precisely why governance has become central toGP-ledexecution.Market prac- tice has converged around clear expecta- tions and discipline: independent board and AIFM oversight, formal conflicts processes, broad investor outreach with documented price tension and transpar- ent economics have shifted from“nice to have” to baseline requirements for cred- ible execution. This is where the market hasmatured themost: theprocess isnow part of the product. Disciplined interpretation and robust governance are essential. A secondary transaction price is a signal shaped by structure, process and portfolio design – not a verdict on asset quality alone. In- terpreting it correctly depends as much on how the transaction is structured and executed as on market conditions. That is why governance failures are no longer “deal-specific”, they can impair market confidence. Beyond volume: the next phase ofmarketmaturity and the conditions for a crediblemarket Looking ahead, early 2026 market updates point to annual secondary vol- umes of USD 250–300 billion (William Blair Private Capital Advisory, Secondary Market Report, 2026) .What began to solve occasional liquidity gaps has evolved into a permanent feature of portfolio management. In a market where exits can stall and capital recycling matters, secondaries provide something rare in private assets: flexibility. The next phase will be about scale and depth. The buyer universe continues to expand throughdedicatedmandates and evergreen capital. As the market institu- tionalizes, Europe and Luxembourg in particulararepositionedtoabsorbagrow- ing share of secondary activity, with the regulatory clarity and structuring depth the next phasewill demand. Scale, however, increases the cost of mis- use. The relevant question is no longer whether secondaries belong in portfolio construction, but how deliberately and consistently they are used across market cycles. Secondaries engineer liquidity by reallocatingownership,notbycompleting the economic life cycle of an asset. That distinction is fundamental. The model turns fragilewhensecondaries systemati- cally bridge weak exits, sustain distribu- tions that assets cannot naturally deliver, or support liquidity features in evergreen vehicles whose redemption capacity de- pends on steady market demand rather than real cashgeneration. Whatultimatelymattersisnothowmuch volume flows through the secondary market, but whether liquidity remains groundedinthefinancialrealityoftheun- derlying assets. Secondariescanfacilitatetherealizationof value, but they cannot replace value cre- ationandrealization.Governance,pricing disciplineandalignmentwithassetreality are not constraints on secondaries – they are the conditions that keep the mecha- nism credible over time. Usedwith rigor, secondariesabsorbfrictionandstrengthen portfolio resilience, but they do not re- move the question of when and how value is realized - they can only defer it. That is the paradox of engineered liquid- ity: it can smooth time, but it cannotman- ufacture outcomes. BoutainaAMMACH Manager,Audit–PrivateEquity AurélienLESBROUSSART SeniorManager,Audit–PrivateEquity LaurentCAPOLAGHI ManagedServicesandPrivateEquityLeader EYLuxembourg Engineered liquidity: How secondaries are reshaping Private Equity portfolio management SecondaryMarket TransactionVolumeOver Times ($bn) Par Charudatta SHENDE, Fixed Income Strategist chez Candriam Lesnégociationsréussiesseremportenten amont, grâce à la préparation. L ’investissement en crédit obéit à lamême logique. Les résultats prennent forme plus tôt, àmesure que l’endette- ment s’accumule, que les condi- tions de liquidité évoluent et que le risque est intégré dans les prix. Le cycle du crédit constitue la trame de fond de ces évolutions, perceptible avant qu’il ne semani- feste dans les défauts. Le risque de crédit est asymétrique : l’in- vestissementgénèredesrendementspro- gressivement, tandis que les pertes peu- vent survenir rapidement lorsque les conditions de refinancement se durcis- sent, que la liquidité se détériore et que les défauts augmentent. Le cycle du cré- dit reflète l’interaction entre emprun- teurs, investisseurs, banques centrales et dynamique de marché. Il permet d’éva- luer si les rendements sont soutenus par des fondamentaux solides ou par des conditions de financement accommo- dantes. Ignorer le cycle, c’est risquer d’être positionné sur le crédit au mau- vais moment. Chez Candriam, nous analysons le cycle à travers deux prismes complémentaires : le cycle de la dette et le cycle économique . Lepremiermesurel’accumulationdel’en- dettement au sein des entreprises et des ménages, ainsi que l’évolution de l’offre de crédit dans le temps. Le second décrit l’environnement macroéconomique dans lequel cette dette doit être servie, refinan- cée et valorisée : croissance, inflation et conditionsmonétaires. Les tensions sur le créditémergentgénéralementlorsqueces deux cycles se renforcent négativement. Lecadred’analyseestdélibérémentpros- pectif. Les défauts, les dégradations de notation et les ventes forcées sont géné- ralement des phénomènes de fin de cycle ; lorsqu’ils deviennent visibles, ils sont souvent déjà intégrésdans les cours. Les signaux les plus exploitables appa- raissent en amont : rythme et finalité de l’endettement, disciplined’octroi, canaux de refinancement et impact de la poli- tique monétaire sur la marge d’erreur. Notre approche s’articule à deux niveaux : une analyse bottom-up des émetteurs — « Quel est le risque que nous détenons ? » — et un overlay top-down ducycle «Est-celemomentducycleoùnous souhaitons détenir ce risque, et si oui, dans quelle proportion et dans quelle structure ? ». L’analyse bottom-up constitue lapremière étape de notre processus d’investisse- ment. Nos analystes formulent une recommandation crédit interne pour chaque émetteur sur la base d’une éva- luation de son profil d’activité, de son profil financier et des risques liés aux événements auxquels il est exposé. Les considérations ESG et le risque cyclique y sont intégrées : qualité de la gouver- nance, besoins de refinancement, profil d’échéancesde ladette, réservesde liqui- dité, résiliencedesfluxde trésorerie, inci- tations de la direction et les actions potentielles en situation de stress. Notre overlay top-down combine l’analyse des conditions macroéconomiques et de l’environnement de crédit, à travers les fondamentaux du marché, les valorisa- tions et les facteurs techniques. Cela per- met d’identifier les segments où la rému- nérations’amélioreetceuxoùelledevient insuffisante,afind’éclairerlaconstruction du portefeuille. Être contrariant en crédit ne signifiepas éviter le risque en permanence. Il s’agit de prendre du risque lorsqu’il est cor- rectement rémunéré et de faire preuve de prudence lorsque lemarché offre une illusion de sécurité en contrepartie de spreads insuffisants. La position de notre portefeuille évolue en fonctionde la rémunérationdu risque au travers des quatre phases du cycle : ajouterdurisqueavecdisciplineenphase d’assainissement, augmenter le bêta en reprise, adopter un portage défensif en expansion et, en ralentissement, privilé- gier la liquidité, la flexibilité et la capacité à redéployer le risque lorsque les dislo- cations créent des opportunités. Chez Candriam, l’équilibre entre l’analyse top-down et bottom-up n’est pas sta- tique : il évolue avec le cycle du crédit . Lorsque la dispersion est élevée et où les résultats dépendent du comportement desémetteursetdeleurstructuredecapi- tal, la convictionbottom-upet la sélection de titres constituent le principal facteur dedifférenciation.Àl’inverse, lorsque les corrélations augmentent et que l’évolu- tion des prix est dominée par une rééva- luation globale du risque, la discipline top-down devient prépondérante. Le cycle du crédit n’est pas un exercice de prévision, c’est un cadre de gestion des risques. Nous cherchons à anticiper les risques - en examinant attentivement les canaux de refinancement, le compor- tement desbilans et la réductionprogres- sive de la marge d’erreur - plutôt qu’à prédire le jour du retournement de cycle. Dans un monde où les transitions peu- vent être brutales et les signaux d’alerte souvent subtils, la préparation compte davantage que la prédiction. En investissement crédit, le meilleur moment pour gérer le risque est précisé- ment celui oùcela semble inutile, lorsque les marchés paraissent sereins. Notre objectif est d’offrir une performance rési- liente à travers les cycles, et la capacité de transformerlespériodesdestressdemar- ché en opportunités lorsque la rémuné- ration du risque redevient attractive. Comprendre le cycle du crédit pour investir avec discipline