Agefi Luxembourg - juillet août 2026
AGEFI Luxembourg 34 Juillet / Août 2026 Fonds &Marchés By Dr. Sebastiaan HOOGHIEMSTRA, senior associate in the investment management practice of Loyens &Loeff in Luxembourg T he right of investors in an open ended fund to redeemtheir full in vestment on each redemptiondate is the defining characteristic of the openended form. Yet for funds in vesting in less liquid assets, private credit, real estate, infrastructure or private equitywrapped in semili quid structures, anunqualified re demption right is incompatible with the investment strategy. Two mechanisms have therefore be come central to the structuring of semili quid funds: preset redemption limitations, commonly called redemption caps, and re demption gates. Although both are quantitative limitations with the sameultimateobjective,restrainingoutflowsinorder tobalanceinvestors’liquidityneedsagainstthepreser vationofthefund’sstrategy,theyareconceptuallyand legally distinct. Confusing them creates documenta tion, governance and regulatory risk under the AIFMD2 framework, CommissionDelegatedRegu lation (EU) 2026/466 (“ RTS ”) and the ESMAGuide lines (the “ Guidelines ”) on liquidity management tools(“ LMTs ”).Thiscontributionexplainseachmech anism,drawsoutthedifferences,andsummarizesthe applicableregulatoryrequirements,includingthefair treatment obligations emphasizedby theCSSF. RedemptionCaps: Structural Terms of theRedemptionPolicy Apreset redemption limitation caps the maximum amount that investors can withdraw on each re demption date or over a defined period. Its essential characteristic is that it is a redemption term: a struc tural, contractual feature of the fund’s redemption policythatappliessystematicallytoinvestors.Itdoes not depend on market stress, a liquidity event, or a management decision at redemption time. It applies because the fund chose to include it among its re demption terms. To be applicable, it must be ex pressly provided for in the redemption terms communicated to investors. Inpractice, caps come in several configurations: Hard vs. SoftLimits Ahard limit leaves the fundor itsmanager no choice oncethesetthresholdisexceeded:redemptionsabove thecaparesimplynotexecuted(andaretypicallycar riedforwardorcancelledinaccordancewiththefund documentation). A soft limit allows the fund or its manager,atitsdiscretion,toauthorizeredemptionsin excess of the preset limitation, provided the relevant cashisavailableandthatdoingso jeopardisesneither the fund’s investment strategy nor the fair treatment ofinvestors.Asahardcapappliesautomatically,itcan createafirstmoveradvantage,anincentivetoredeem early, before the cap bites, particularly in funds mar keted to both retail andprofessional investors. Investorlevel vs. Fundlevel Restrictions An exante investor restriction limits the amount a giveninvestormayredeemateachredemptionpoint, e.g. a stated percentage of that investor’s holding per quarter. An exante fundlevel restriction limits the aggregate amount redeemable by all in vestorscombined,e.g.apercentageofNAVper quarter. The two canbe combined. Staggered Exits and Backstops Afund may cap withdrawals on each re demption date at a given percentage ofholdingofaninvestorrequesting fullredemption,spreadingtheexit over several quarters, provided notice is given before the first re demption date. Funds may also implement backstops, including limitations over several months, if clearlydisclosed. The decisive legal point is classifica tion.Aredemption cap, as such, is not a LMTwithin themeaning ofAnnexVAIFMD2. It fallswithin the residualcategoryof“otherLMTs”,i.e.,otherliquidity management arrangements and redemption terms that funds remain free to adopt alongside, and in ad dition to, the harmonizedAnnexVAIFMD2 toolkit. The Annex V list (suspension, gates, notice periods, fees,swing/dualpricing,antidilutionlevies,redemp tioninkind, side pockets) harmonizes a defined set of tools but does not exhaust theuniverse of liquidity arrangements a fundmay build into its terms. RedemptionGates: aHarmonized LMT and aDiscretionary Power Aredemption gate is fundamentally different in na ture.ItisoneoftheLMTslistedinAnnexVAIFMD2, and it is not a redemption conditionbut apower that themanagermayexerciseincertainsituations.Agate allowsafundtotemporarilylimitredemptionswhen requests exceed a predefined thresh old (typically a percentage of NAV). Anyunexecutedrequestsmaybede ferred,carriedover,executedprorata, or cancelled, as set out in the fund’s documentation. The documentation should specify whether carriedover portionsreceivepriorityovernewor ders for the next dealing day. Grant ing such priority would itself fuel firstmover advantage, so funds typ ically treat both equally. The point deserving particular em phasis is the activation mechanism. A gate is anchored to an activation threshold, but exceeding it does not activate the gate automatically, it merely opens the possibility. The manager,providedithasselectedthe gate and holds the corresponding powers, may then decide either to activate it or to continue executing redemptionsinfull,havingregardto liquidity, market conditions and in vestors’bestinterests.Thethresholdisthusnecessary but not sufficient for gating, the mirror image of a hard cap, where exceeding the threshold leaves no discretion at all. Gates vs. Caps: The differences, distilled Application: Certainty vs. Discretion This is the principal distinction. Redemption caps apply systematically: they are part of the redemption terms, investors can rely on their application at every redemption point, and (for hard limits) no judgment intervenes. Gates apply contingently: arepowers, ex ercisedepisodicallyunderredemptionpressure,only following a discretionarydecision. Legal Nature: Contractual Termvs. AnnexVAIFMD2 Capsareredemptionterms,contractualfeaturesofthe product, andconstitute “otherLMTs”outsideAnnex VAIFMD2. Gates areharmonizedAnnexVAIFMD 2 LMTs, subject to theRTS andGuidelines. TriggerMechanics Ahard cap is selfexecuting once its threshold is ex ceeded; a soft cappermits upwarddiscretion (allow ing more redemptions than the cap); a gate involves downward discretion (restricting redemptions that would otherwise be honoured) and only becomes available once its activation threshold is exceeded. BoundaryCase: whenCaps become Gates The two categories can converge. Because a redemp tioncaphasthesamecharacteristicsasagate,aquan titative limitation with the objective of limiting redemptions, a manager may wish to count a re demption cap as one of the two LMTs it must select pursuanttoArticle16(2)(b)AIFMD2.Inthatcase,the limitationmust complywith the requirements of the directive and the implementing standards, and the managermust have the necessary powers to activate and deactivate it. In substance, the limitation then ceases tobeapurelyautomatic redemption termand takes on the legal characteristics of a gate. Managers should make a deliberate choice: either the cap re mainsastructuralredemptiontermoutsideAnnexV AIFMD2, or it is engineeredas a compliantAnnexV AIFMD 2 gate, but the documentation should not leave the classification ambiguous. Why theDistinctionMatters after AIFMD2 Classificationdetermineswhich obligations attach to each mechanism. Only gates count towards the two mandatory Annex VAIFMD 2 LMTs under Article 16(2)(b) AIFMD 2. Caps generally do not, unless en gineeredasagatepertheboundarycaseabove.Gates requiregovernancearrangements,adiscretionaryac tivation decision, and may trigger notification to the regulatoronactivationanddeactivation.Caps,bycon trast,arelargelycontractual:setonceinthedocumen tationandappliedwithoutaseparatedecisionateach redemptionpoint. The RTS sharpen this contrast for gates specifically, framingtheactivationthresholdandpermittinggates to be applied at fund level, investor level, or both, the investorlevel option aimed at mitigating firstmover advantage in fundswith fewprofessional investors. The Guidelines add a calibration layer on top: man agers should combine at least one quantitative tool (suchasagate)withatleastoneantidilutiontool,cal ibrated to the fund’s strategy, liquidity, and dealing cycle,withgovernancearrangementsidentifyingwho decides on activation andhowinvestors and the reg ulator are informed. Caps&Gates ConcurrentDrafting inPractice Funddocumentationincreasinglycombinesadiscre tionaryredemptiongatewithaseparatesoftredemp tion cap. This structure is generally workable where the twomechanisms operate independently: thegate as anAnnexVAIFMD2LMTactivatedat thediscre tion of the AIFM, and the soft limit as a separate re demption feature applying alongside it. Difficultiesarisewherethesoftlimiteffectivelydeter mines the amount of redemption requests that may be satisfied once the relevant threshold has been ex ceeded. In such circumstances, the gatemay cease to have independent operational significance and the soft limit may, in substance, perform the same func tion as the gate itself. Particular care is therefore re quired where the soft limit is expressed to apply “notwithstanding” the gate, the ELTIF Regulation or other applicable law, as suchdraftingmaycreate ten sion with the governance framework envisaged by AnnexVAIFMD2, theRTS and theGuidelines. Fair Treatment andCSSF Expectations Whateverthemechanism,fairtreatmentis theoverarchingconstraint.Liquidityman agementmeasuresandtoolsmustinprin cipleapplyinthesamewaytoallinvestors in the fund. Differentiated redemption terms and conditions may be applied to different categories of shares or units, but onlyprovided thisdoesnot result ina sig nificant overall disadvantage for the other investors,inparticularretailinvestors,and is not prohibitedunder theEuropean reg ulations thatmay apply. Soft caps must be exercised in a manner consistent with fair treatment; investor levelmechanismsmust not beused toad vantage particular investors; backstops and all other limitations must be clearly disclosed;andthewholearchitecturemust bereflectedintheredemptiontermscom municated to investors presubscription. Conclusion Redemption caps and redemption gates answer the same economic problem with different legal instruments. The cap is exante, systematic and structural, a redemption term, an “other LMT” out sidetheAnnexVAIFMD2list.Thegateiscontingent, discretionary and harmonized, anAnnex VAIFMD 2LMTwhoseactivationthresholdopens,butdoesnot compel,itsuse.Managersofsemiliquidfundsshould revisit their redemption architecture, classify each mechanism deliberately, including any concurrently drafted caps and gates, document their two selected LMTs, and confirm the framework meets the AIFMD’sandtheCSSF’sfairtreatmentanddisclosure expectations. Redemption Constraints in Fund Structures: Distinguishing Redemption Caps fromGates Feature ȱ Redemption ȱ Caps ȱ Redemption ȱ Gates ȱ Legal ȱ nature ȱ Redemption ȱ term ȱ (contractual, ȱ structural) ȱ LMT ȱ (Annex ȱ V ȱ AIFMD ȱ 2) ȱ Classification ȱ “Other ȱ LMT” ȱ (outside ȱ Annex ȱ V ȱ AIFMD ȱ 2) ȱ Harmonized ȱ LMT ȱ (Annex ȱ V ȱ AIFMD ȱ 2) ȱ Application ȱ Systematic ȱ (applies ȱ at ȱ each ȱ redemption ȱ point) ȱ Contingent ȱ (applies ȱ only ȱ if ȱ activated) ȱ Trigger ȱ Automatic ȱ once ȱ cap ȱ is ȱ exceeded ȱ (hard ȱ cap) ȱ Activation ȱ threshold ȱ must ȱ be ȱ exceeded ȱ and ȱ manager ȱ decision ȱ Discretion ȱ None ȱ (hard ȱ cap) ȱ or ȱ upward ȱ discretion ȱ (soft ȱ cap ȱ allows ȱ more ȱ redemptions) ȱ Downward ȱ discretion ȱ (manager ȱ decides ȱ whether ȱ to ȱ restrict ȱ redemptions) ȱ Timing ȱ Ex Ȭ ante ȱ (built ȱ into ȱ fund ȱ terms) ȱ Ex Ȭ post ȱ (used ȱ in ȱ stress ȱ or ȱ elevated ȱ outflows) ȱ Regulatory ȱ regime ȱ General ȱ AIFMD ȱ 2 ȱ + ȱ fair ȱ treatment ȱ principles ȱ AIFMD ȱ 2 ȱ + ȱ Annex ȱ V ȱ + ȱ RTS ȱ + ȱ Guidelines ȱ Investor ȱ expectation Predictable ȱ and ȱ fully ȱ disclosed ȱ in ȱ advance ȱ Conditional ȱ and ȱ dependent ȱ on ȱ manager ȱ action ȱ Supervisory ȱ interaction ȱ No ȱ specific ȱ activation ȱ notification ȱ Activation/deactivation ȱ may ȱ require ȱ regulator ȱ notification ȱ Risk ȱ if ȱ misclassified ȱ Limited ȱ (if ȱ clearly ȱ drafted ȱ as ȱ term) ȱ High ȱ (if ȱ treated ȱ as ȱ gate ȱ without ȱ RTS/Guidelines ȱ compliance) ȱ Table: KeyDifferences betweenRedemptionCaps andRedemptionGates F ace aux tensions géopoli tiques et aux incertitudes éco nomiques, les grandes fortunesmondiales diversifient leurs portefeuilles et renforcent leurs investissements dans l’intelli gence artificielle (IA). Lesfamilyofficesadaptentleursstratégies d’investissement à un environnement devenu plus instable. Selon le Rapport mondial2026d’UBSsurlesfamilyoffices, ces structures privilégient désormais la résilience, la diversification et les investis sementsde long termepour faire faceaux risques géopolitiques et économiques. L’étude s’appuie sur les réponses de 307 family offices répartis dans plus de 30 marchés, représentant une fortune nette moyennede 2,7milliards dedollars. Pour lapremière fois, 60%des structures inter rogées prévoient de modifier leur alloca tionstratégiqued’actifsaucoursdesdouze prochainsmois.Lesconflitsgéopolitiques apparaissentcommelaprincipalemenace, tandisquel’endettementmondial,lavola tilité des marchés et les risques de réces sionincitentlesinvestisseursàajusterpro gressivement leurs positions. « Les family offices continuent d’ajuster leursportefeuillesdemanièremesurée,en diversifiant leurs actifs, leurs devises et leursrégions»,expliqueBenjaminCavalli, responsable des clients stratégiques chez UBSGlobalWealthManagement. Malgré cette prudence, l’Amérique du Nord reste la principale zone d’investis sement. Toutefois, de nombreux family offices souhaitent réduire leur dépen dance aux actifs américains et renforcer leur exposition à l’Europe occidentale, à l’AsiePacifique et à la Grande Chine. Environ 65 %des répondants anticipent un affaiblissement du statut du dollar américain comme monnaie de réserve mondiale. L’euro figure parmi les prin cipales alternatives dans les stratégies multidevises. L’IAdomine les investissements L’intelligence artificielle demeure le prin cipal thème d’investissement mondial. Près de 65 % des family offices ont déjà investi dans ce secteur, notamment dans les centres de données, les logiciels et les semiconducteurs. Les investissements liés à l’IAconcernent aussi les infrastructures, l’énergie et la santé : 37%desfamilyofficesinvestissent dans les infrastructures et l’énergie, tandis que33%ciblentlasantésoutenueparl’in telligence artificielle. Àl’inverse, les cryp tomonnaies restent marginales, avec seu lement 24 % des structures exposées. Le rapport met également en évidence des fragilitésdans lagouvernance et laprépa rationdes nouvelles générations. Moins de lamoitié des family offices dis posentd’uncadreformeldegouvernance et seulement 35 % ont établi un plan de succession.L’implicationdeshéritiersreste limitée : seuls 27 % des family offices ont mis en place un programme structuré pour préparer la prochaine génération à ses futures responsabilités. Les stratégies restent contrastées selon les régions. AuxÉtatsUnis, 88%des investissements demeurent concentrés en Amérique du Nord. EnEurope, les investisseurs accélè rent la diversification géographique et monétaire, tandis qu’en Asie du SudEst, 88 % des family offices ont déjà investi dans l’intelligence artificielle. Au Moyen Orient, 82 % des structures prévoient de modifier leurs allocations d’actifs. Rapport :https://urls.fr/EsTJq_ Les family offices misent sur la résilience 3FDŖG0 alboGl USPQF ylimaF 2602
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