Agefi Luxembourg - juin 2026

Juin 2026 27 AGEFI Luxembourg Fonds &Marchés ByDr.SebastiaanH OOGHIEMSTRA ,seniorassociate in the investment management practice of Loyens & Loeff in Luxembourg P ractitioners spend considerable time analyzing howredemptions are paid. They spend far less time analyzingwhether a redemption right came into existence in the first place. That asymmetry is the source ofmost classification errors in semiliquid fund structures and, under AIFMD2, it is increas­ ingly costly. Arecent prior contribution in this mag­ azine introduced a threequestion framework for distinguishing openended from closedendedAIFsinevergreenstructures,anchored in the distinction between a redemption right and a redemption request. The questions framing this distinction are: 1)Isthereanypreliquidationredemptionmechanism 2) Does investor initiative create a binding obligation to redeem? 3)DoLMTsmanageexistingredemptionpressure,or substitute for the absence of a right? Thiscontributiontakesthatframeworkastepfurther. It argues that the decisive variable for openended­ nessisnotwhetherliquidityisofferedorhowitisex­ ecuted, butwhether themanager hasdiscretionover acceptance of the redemption request. Gates, rolling settlement and other liquidity management tools (“ LMTs ”) are execution mechanics. They operate, if at all, onlyonce a redemption right has already crys­ tallized. Conflating acceptance with execution is the doctrinal mistake that makes semiliquid structures so difficult to classify. RedemptionRights vs RedemptionRequests: Acceptance Is theOrganizing Principle The definition of an openendedAIF inCommission Delegated Regulation (EU) No 694/2014 (“ CDR 2014 ”) asks whether units or shares are redeemed or repurchased at investor request prior to liquidation. That definition is formally clear but structurally in­ complete: it asks onlywhether a redemptionmecha­ nism exists, not whether it generates an enforceable entitlement. The more fundamental question is whether themanager can refuse. Ifyes,themanagerretainsunconditionaldiscretionto decline,deferorignorea redemptionrequest withno binding timetable andno objective threshold trigger­ ing an obligation and the investor holds no enforce­ able entitlement. The fund is closedended, irrespectiveofwhetherperiodicredemptionwindows appear in the offering documents or whether the manager has historicallyhonoured requests. If no, the acceptance is binding once the investor sat­ isfiestheconditionssetoutinthefunddocumentsand a redemption right crystallizesupon submissionof a compliant request. What follows, settlement timing, liquiditymanagement, gate mechanics, is a question of execution, not ofwhether the redemption right ex­ ists.Theorganizingprincipleisthereforebinaryatthe acceptancestage:acceptanceiseitherdiscretionaryor binding.Thereisnomeaningfulintermediatecat­ egory.Whatpractitionerssometimescall“softac­ ceptance”, where requests are procedurally acknowledged but managerially deferred, re­ solves, on analysis, into one of these two posi­ tions depending on whether the deferral represents a managed execution or a unilateral (discretionary) refusal. TheRedemptionLifecycle AFourStage Taxonomy Contemporary evergreen funds do not fall always neatly into the closedended or in the open­ endedcategory.Inpractice,there­ demption lifecycle can be identified and distinguished into four distinct stages. Most classifica­ tion disputes arise from conflating two or moreofthesestages.Thefourstagetaxonomysetout in the table belowmay help into clarifying the legal moment at which, if ever, a redemption entitlement crystallizes. (see table below) The table makes the doctrinal point visible. Only the acceptancestagedetermineswhetheranopenended indicator is present. Everything below it, execution mechanics, LMT design, settlement timing, is legally posteriortothatdetermination.Inallcasesofbinding acceptance, themanager is subject to an obligation to execute the redemption request. However, the scope of that obligation may be absolute (full execution), proportional(prorataexecution),temporal(deferred execution),orextinguishing(cancellationoftheresid­ ual).Thepresenceofaredemptiongatedoesnotqual­ ify acceptance. Instead, it qualifies execution. The decisive question is not whether the request is ac­ cepted, but how, and towhat extent, it is performed. The practical consequence is significant. A fund that accepts redemption requests on a binding basis but settles them quarterly, with a gate at ten percent of NAV,isopenended.Thegaterestrictsexecutionofan existingright.Itdoesnoteliminatetheright.Liquidity pressure is createdupon acceptance, not upon settle­ ment. The investor whose request has been accepted but not yet settledhas a redemption entitlement. Just as a creditor whose debt is payable in six months al­ readyholds a claim. TheDoctrinalMistake: Rolling (Discretionary) Settlement ≠NoRedemptionRight Themost persistent error in practice is to treat rolling settlementordeferred(discretionary)executionasev­ idencethatnoredemptionrightexists.Thatreasoning conflates performancewith entitlement. Consider two fund structures side by side: Structure A : Investors may redeem quarterly. Ac­ cepted redemption requests may be carried forward to subsequent dealingdates, if insufficient liquidity is available at the relevant date. Structure B : Investors may submit redemption re­ questsatanytime.Themanagerretainsfulldiscretion to accept or decline any request, without restriction andwithout any obligation toprovide reasons. StructureAisopenended.Acceptanceisbinding.The carryforwardmechanicisaninstanceofdeferredex­ ecution, namely the management of a crystallized right over time. Structure B is closedended. No right arises because acceptance is at themanager’s uncon­ ditioneddiscretion.Bothstructuresmaybemarketed as“semiliquid”.Bothmayoperateperiodicredemp­ tionwindows.Thecommercialpresentationissimilar. The legal analysis is entirely different and under AIFMD2, that differencehasdirect consequences for leverage limits andmandatoryLMT requirements. The same logic applies toLMTsmore broadly.Agate imposed on an existing redemption entitlement con­ stitutes a legitimate liquiditymanagement tool of the kind expressly contemplated byAIFMD 2 and is, in thetaxonomyabove,aninstanceofprorataexecution. By contrast, where a discretionary refusal right oper­ atesattheacceptancestage,anygateisredundant:ab­ sentacrystallizedredemptionentitlement,thereisno liquidity pressure tomanage andLMTs have no role toplay. This distinctionmatters, as the two structures give rise todifferent regulatory obligations. Implications for FundDocumentation and theOpen/ClosedendedClassification The binary acceptance framework imposes a specific diagnostic on fund documentation. Classification analysis should proceed in sequence. First, identify whether the fund documents contain any preliqui­ dation redemption mechanism. If not, the fund is closedended. Second, and this is the critical step, ask whether the manager can refuse a compliant re­ demption request. If yes, no redemption right exists and the closedended indicator is present. If no, a re­ demption right crystallizes on submission, and the fundcarriesopenendedindicatorsregardlessofhow settlement is structured. Inpractice,theanswertothesecondquestionisoften obscuredbydrafting.Funddocumentsfrequentlyin­ clude broaddiscretion language alongside procedu­ ral redemption mechanics, without clearly delineating which applies to acceptance and which applies to execution. Terms such as “the manager mayinitsdiscretionsatisfyredemptionrequests”can be read as acceptance discretion (closedended indi­ cator)orasexecutiondiscretionoveranalreadybind­ ing acceptance (openended with managed settlement).Thedifferenceisnottrivial,andthedraft­ ing is often not intentional. Afurther layer of complexity ariseswhere fund doc­ umentsaresilentastothefateofunexecutedportions. Where the carryforward or cancellationmechanic is not clearly specified, classification of the execution model, and thus the investor’s residual position,may beuncertain.AIFMsshouldensurethattheexecution modelisexpresslydocumented,andthatinvestorsare informedofwhetheranunexecutedportiongivesrise to a continuing entitlement or requires resubmission. AIFMs should document their classification analysis explicitly,identifyingatwhichstage,ifany,managerial discretionoperatesandwhetherthatdiscretionaffects acceptanceoronlyexecution.Thatanalysisshouldbe anchored in the governingdocuments and reviewed in light of the regulatory purpose of the AIFMD 2 LMTframework,whichpresupposestheexistenceof investordrivenliquiditypressure.Wherenoredemp­ tion right has crystallized, that pressure cannot arise, and the LMT regime has nomeaningful application. Outlook The thesis of this contribution can be stated simply: the openended/closedended classification turns on whether themanager has discretion over acceptance oftheredemptionrequest,notoverthetimingorme­ chanics of execution. Liquidity pressure is created at the moment of acceptance. Everything thereafter, gates, rolling settlement, in specie payment, is the management of that pressure, not a substitute for it. Theexecutiontaxonomyintroducedinthisarticle,dis­ tinguishing full, prorata, deferredandextinguishing execution, provides the analytical vocabulary to de­ scribewhathappensafteracceptancewithoutdisturb­ ingthebinarylogicthatgovernsclassificationitself.A gate isprorata execution.A(discretionary) carryfor­ wardisdeferredexecution.Acancellationonnonset­ tlement is extinguishing execution. None of these affects the classificationof the fund.All of themaffect the investor’s postacceptance position. Semiliquid fund structureswill continue togenerate classificationquestionsthattheCDR2014framework was not designed to resolve. Until further regulatory guidanceemerges,thebinaryacceptancetestprovides the most legally coherent and practically workable basis for that analysis. The question to ask is not how liquid the fund is in practice. It is whether, when a compliantredemptionrequestissubmitted,theman­ ager is free to sayno. When Does a Redemption Request Become a Redemption Right? Rethinking Open-Endedness underAIFMD 2 Stage ȱ Question ȱ Acceptance ȱ discretionary ȱ Acceptance ȱ binding ȱ Request ȱ Can ȱ the ȱ investor ȱ ask? ȱ Yes ȱ Yes ȱ Acceptance ȱ Must ȱ the ȱ manager ȱ accept? ȱ No ȱ ĺ ȱ closed Ȭ ended ȱ indicator ȱ Yes ȱ ĺ ȱ open Ȭ ended ȱ indicator ȱ Execution ȱ Must ȱ the ȱ manager ȱ honour ȱ the ȱ right? ȱ Not ȱ applicable ȱ Yes, ȱ execution ȱ mechanics ȱ apply: ȱ Ȭȱ Full ȱ execution : ȱ request ȱ honoured ȱ in ȱ full ȱ on ȱ dealing ȱ date ȱ Ȭȱ Pro Ȭ rata ȱ (partial) ȱ execution: ȱ accepted ȱ in ȱ full ȱ but ȱ executed ȱ proportionally ȱ (e.g. ȱ under ȱ a ȱ gate). ȱ The ȱ obligation ȱ is ȱ quantitatively ȱ limited ȱ and ȱ not ȱ discretionary ȱ Ȭȱ Deferred ȱ execution : ȱ unexecuted ȱ portion ȱ carried ȱ forward. ȱ Investor ȱ retains ȱ an ȱ enforceable ȱ claim ȱ discharged ȱ over ȱ subsequent ȱ dealing ȱ dates ȱ Ȭȱ Extinguishing ȱ execution : ȱ unexecuted ȱ portion ȱ cancelled. ȱ no ȱ residual ȱ claim. ȱ Investors ȱ must ȱ resubmit ȱ (model ȱ frequently ȱ observed ȱ in ȱ ELTIF ȱ and ȱ semi Ȭ liquid ȱ evergreen ȱ structures) ȱ Settlement ȱ When ȱ are ȱ proceeds ȱ paid? ȱ Not ȱ applicable ȱ Timing ȱ governed ȱ by ȱ LMTs ȱ and ȱ fund ȱ terms. ȱ Does ȱ not ȱ affect ȱ existence ȱ of ȱ the ȱ redemption ȱ right ȱ L a reprise dumarchémondial duprivate equitymarque une nouvelle fois le pas. Selon le rapport semestriel 2026 publié par Bain&Company, une série de chocs économiques et fi­ nanciers a interrompu lʹélan ob­ servé endébut dʹannée, plongeant le secteur dans une dynamique qualifiée de « jour sans fin ». Après les inquiétudes liées aux droits de douane en 2025, trois nouveaux facteurs ont pesé sur les marchés au premier semestre 2026 : la correction des valorisa­ tionsdans le secteurdes logiciels sous lʹef­ fet de lʹintelligence artificielle, les tensions dans le crédit privé et la hausse des prix de lʹénergie provoquée par les tensions géopolitiques auMoyenOrient. Ces évé­ nements ont provoqué un ralentissement généralisé des transactions, des sorties dʹinvestissements et des levées de fonds. Les écarts de valorisation entre vendeurs et acheteurs se sont creusés, tandis quede nombreux comités dʹinvestissement ont adopté une approche plus prudente. Malgré ce contexte difficile, Bain estime que les fondamentaux dumarché restent solides.Lesmarchésfinanciersdemeurent ouverts, lʹéconomiemondiale poursuit sa croissance et les fonds de private equity disposent encore dʹimportantes réserves de capitaux à investir. Pour le cabinet de conseil, les sociétés de gestion qui réussi­ rontdanscetenvironnementplusexigeant seront celles capablesde se concentrer sur les leviers quʹellesmaîtrisent directement. La création de valeur opérationnelle, lʹin­ tégrationdelʹintelligenceartificielle,laspé­ cialisationsectorielle,lagestiondestalents et ladisciplinedʹexécutionfigurent parmi les priorités stratégiques identifiées. Le rapport souligne notamment que lʹIA est désormaisdevenueunmoteur incon­ tournable de création de valeur. Les acteurs les plus avancés ne se limitent plus à expérimenter la technologie, mais repensent leurs processus opérationnels, renforcent leurs infrastructures de don­ nées et déploient des cas dʹusage à grande échelle. Sur le plan sectoriel, Bain observe une réorientation des investissements vers des activités considérées comme moins exposées auxbouleversements liés à lʹIA. Lesvalorisationsdes éditeursde logiciels détenus par des fonds de private equity ont reculé au premier trimestre 2026, mais dans des proportions nettement inférieures à celles observées sur lesmar­ chés boursiers. Lʹétudemet également en lumière laper­ sistance du blocage des sorties, principal freinaucycleducapital.Lesfondsdepri­ vateequitydétiennentactuellementenvi­ ron 33 000 entreprises en portefeuille qui nʹont pas encore été cédées, tandis que la durée moyenne de détention des actifs approche désormais sept ans, un niveau historiquement élevé. Malgré les interrogations croissantes sur les valorisations des actifs privés, Bain relève quʹenviron trois quarts des entre­ prises cédées continuent dʹêtre vendues à un prix supérieur à leur valorisation précédente, signe que les acheteurs res­ tent disposés à payer une prime pour les actifs de qualité. Les perspectives à court terme demeu­ rent toutefois prudentes. Les données dʹOntra, spécialiste des workflows pour les marchés privés, suggèrent que lʹacti­ vité transactionnelledevrait rester globa­ lement stable jusquʹà lʹété 2026, sans véri­ table accélération généralisée. Pour Bain, le private equity entre désor­ maisdansunenouvellephasedesonhis­ toire, caractérisée par une concurrence accrue et des exigences plus fortes en matière de performance opérationnelle. Dans ce contexte, les sociétés capables de développer un avantage compétitif clair et de concentrer leurs ressources sur les actifs les plus prometteurs disposeront desmeilleures chances de tirer leur épin­ gle du jeu lorsque les conditions demar­ ché sʹamélioreront. Le private equity freiné par les turbulences de marché ©Stock.Adobe