Agefi Luxembourg - septembre 2026

Septembre 2026 17 AGEFI Luxembourg Économie & Banques ByAdelinREMY, Editor A zerbaijan is one of themost important energy transit states between theCaspian region andEurope. The systemis dominated by pipelines, but rail, road, maritime, and air cargo also play supporting roles. During the Soviet period (19171991), Azerbaijani oil produc­ tionwas integrated into a centrali­ zedSoviet network.Most export routes flowednorthward through the Soviet pipeline systemtoward Russia and other Soviet republics. The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 created an immediate problemasAzerbaijan possessedmajor oil reserves, export infra­ structure remained largely dependent on Russia andWestern investorswantednon­ Russian export routes. This led to the crea­ tion of entirely newcorridors. Oil Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan (BTC) The BTC pipeline is Azerbaijan’s most important oil export route, opened in 2006, about 1,768 km (1,099 miles), with a capacity of more than 1 million barrels/day and 224millionbarrels in 2024. The route is: From theAzeriChiragGunashli fields (akaAzeri– Chirag–Deepwater Gunashli), about 120 km (75 miles) off the coast ofAzerbaijan in theCaspian Sea to the Sangachal Terminal (near Baku,Azerbaijan) to the BTC Pipeline (BakuTbilisi, GeorgiaCeyhan, Turkey) to Mediterranean tankers to Europe and worldmarkets. BTC emerged during the late 1990s and was sup­ ported by the USA (President Bill Clinton) and by Turkey (President Suleyman Demirel) during the presidency of HeydarAliyev. BTCgave direct access to global maritime markets through the Mediter­ ranean, reduced Russian transit dominance and strengthenedAzerbaijan, Georgia andTurkey. WesternRoute Export Pipeline (WREP) From Baku to Supsa, Georgia on the Black Sea, the first major Westernbacked export corridor afterindependencedevelopedbytheconsortium ledbyBP, opened in 1999. TheWREPbuilt strate­ gic links with Georgia, demonstrated the feasi­ bilityof EastWest energy transport, proved thatCaspianoilcouldreachworldmar­ ketswithoutpassingthroughRussia and is consideredbyanalysts as the precursorofBTC.2024exportswere only about 1 million barrels, much smaller thanBTC. Baku–Novorossiysk Pipeline (also known as the Northern Route Export Pipeline and Northern Early Oil Pipeline) The route is: fromtheSangachalTerminal(nearBaku,Azerbaijan) toDagestan(toChechnyauntiltheSecondChechnya War (19992009)) to Novorossiysk (Russia) terminal at the Black Sea coast inRussia A1,330km(830miles)longoil pipeline,operatedbySOCAR and by Transneft, Moscow, built during the Soviet period and reused after indepen­ dence. It becameAzerbaijan’s first postSoviet export route because it alreadyexisted. It is still controlled by Russia, through the unstable North Caucasusandexportvolumes remained limited (36 million barrels/year). NaturalGas: TheSouthern GasCorridor (SGC) The Southern Gas Corridor (SGC) was developed be­ tween 2013 and 2020, to ex­ pand the South Caucasus Pipeline (SCP) and to build theTransAnatolianPipeline(TANAP)andtheTrans AdriaticPipeline(TAP).Thisistheflagshiproutecon­ necting the Shah Deniz field, the largest natural gas field discovered in 1999 in Azerbaijan, to European consumers. ThistransformedAzerbaijanfromprimarilyanoilex­ porter into a major gas exporter. BTC (oil) and SCP (gas)wereconceivedtogethertosupplyinitiallyGeor­ giaandTurkeywiththeSouthernGasCorridor(SGC) and later inEurope. The “Exploration, Development, and Production SharingAgreement” (PSA) for Shah Deniz area was signed between SOCAR (The State Oil Company of the Republic of Azerbaijan) and some oil companies of foreign countries on June 4, 1996. The Shah Deniz field is operated by BP (29.99%) along with LUKoil (19.99%), TPAO (Turkish Petroleum Corporation, (19.00%), SOCAR(14.35%) andothers. The route is: fromtheShahDenizfield,Azerbaijan(CaspianSea) to the Sangachal Terminal (near Baku,Azerbaijan) to the South Caucasus Pipeline (SCP) (also known as Baku–TbilisiErzurum Pipeline, BTE Pipeline, or Shah Deniz Pipeline) opened in 2006 throughAzer­ baijan, Georgia, Turkey with a capacity of 24 bcm/year; expandable to 34 bcm/year to the TransAnatolian Pipeline (TANAP), across Turkey, opened in 2018 by SOCAR and BOTAŞ (BOTAŞ Petroleum Pipeline Corporation), the state­ ownedcrudeoilandnaturalgaspipelinesandtrading companyinTurkey.Turkeywantedtobecomeanen­ ergy hub between Asia and Europe, TANAP being the central segment. totheTransAdriaticPipeline(TAP)throughGreece, Albania, Italy, opened in 2020 with a capacity of 10 bcm/year. The Southern Gas Corridor (SGC) investment was about 40 billion $. More than 3,200 km (1,988miles) of newpipeline in­ frastructurewasbuiltforSCPexpansion,TANAPand TAP. Shah Deniz Phase (or Stage) 2 added roughly 16 bcm/year of gas production to feed the corridor. AzerbaijanigashasbeenreachingEuropeanmarkets via TAPsince late 2020. Rail Transport Railisincreasinglyimportantforpetroleumproducts, chemicals, containers and Central Asian cargo tran­ siting toEurope KeyLine: Baku–Tbilisi–Kars (BTK) Route: Azerbaijan, Georgia, Turkey, Europe, as a part of theMiddle Corridor (aka the TransCaspian International Transport Route (TITR)), connecting China and CentralAsia with Europe. Total BTK length: 850 km, Azerbaijan segment: 504 km (Azerbaijan rail network: 2,958 km), freight wagon fleet: 5,795 wagons. Rail accounted for about 46% of corridor freight. TruckRoutes Truck transport mainly serves regional trade, con­ tainerized cargo, energy equipment, spare parts and industrial goods. The key corridors are: the Middle Corridor (aka the TransCaspian Inter­ national Transport Route (TITR), EastWest): Route: Kazakhstan, Caspian ferries, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Turkey, Europe theNorthernCorridor (NorthSouth. Route: Russia, Azerbaijan, Iran, PersianGulf In 2024, road freight through corridors represented 10.09million tons and transit cargomore than40%of road corridor traffic. Maritime Transport TheCaspian Sea ferry systemis essential. Route: Kazakhstan & Turkmenistan, Caspian Sea, Baku, rail & truck toGeorgia, Turkey, Europe. Azerbaijan is actively expanding transit capacity for KazakhoilcrossingtheCaspianandenteringtheBTC system. Discussions have targeted 57 million tons/year of Kazakhoil transit. CargoAirlines Forenergycommoditiesthemselves,cargoaviationis almost irrelevant because oil and gas move by pipeline, ship, rail, or truck. Air cargo is mainly used for highvalue oilfield equipment, turbines, drilling electronics andurgent spare parts. The principal aviationhub isHeydarAliyev Interna­ tionalAirport. Cargo carriers operating throughAzerbaijan include major international freight operators (such as Car­ golux), but aviationvolumes are tiny comparedwith pipeline and rail flows. Key Figures A useful way to think about Azerbaijan is that it functionsasadualgateway:amajorenergycorridor (oil and gas to Europe via Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan (BTC) and theSouthernGasCorridor (SGC)) anda growingMiddleCorridorlogisticshublinkingCen­ tral Asia, theCaucasus, Turkey, and the EU. The Zangezur Corridor TheZangezurcorridorisaconceptfora43kmtrans­ port corridor that emerged after the 2020 Nagorno­ Karabakh war, promoted byAzerbaijan and Turkey asadirectlandlinkbetweenmainlandAzerbaijanand its Nakhchivan exclave throughArmenia’s southern Syunikprovince. Azerbaijan’smostobviousbenefitisadirectlandroute between itsmainlandandNakhchivanwithout rely­ ing on transit through Iran, shortening the Middle Corridor, improved access toTurkey. For Armenia, the Zangezur corridor would mean the end of transport isolation as Armenia’s borders with Turkey and Azerbaijan have largely been closed for decades. Armenia would also benefit from transit fees and gain all other benefits from openingborders (economic activity, trade, direct in­ vestments, job creation…). Timeline Azerbaijan is one of the most important energy transit states betweenAsia and Europe BTC ȱ oil ȱ pipeline ȱ >1 ȱ million ȱ barrels/day ȱ capacity ȱȱ BTC ȱ exports ȱ in ȱ 2024 ȱ 224 ȱ million ȱ barrels ȱȱ SCP ȱ gas ȱ pipeline ȱ 24 ȱ bcm/year ȱ capacity ȱ after ȱ expansion ȱȱ SCP ȱ gas ȱ pipeline ȱ expansion ȱ 34 ȱ bcm/year ȱȱ Southern ȱ Gas ȱ Corridor ȱ ȱ investment ȱ 40 ȱ billion ȱ $ ȱ Corridor ȱ freight ȱ in ȱ 2024 ȱ 33.3 ȱ million ȱ tons ȱ (total ȱ of ȱ the ȱ 3 ȱ lines ȱ below) ȱ Sea ȱ freight ȱ in ȱ 2024 ȱ 7.9 ȱ million ȱ tons ȱ Rail ȱ freight ȱ in ȱ 2024 ȱ 15.3 ȱ million ȱ tons ȱȱ Road ȱ freight ȱ in ȱ 2024 ȱ 10.1 ȱ million ȱ tons ȱȱ ȱ 1870s–1917 ȱ Baku ȱ oil ȱ boom ȱ operated ȱ by ȱ Ludvig ȱ and ȱ Robert ȱ Nobel, ȱ at ȱ one ȱ point ȱ 50% ȱ of ȱ the ȱ world’s ȱ oil; ȱ first ȱ Caspian ȱ maritime ȱ links ȱ Soviet ȱ era ȱ Energy ȱ and ȱ transport ȱ integrated ȱ into ȱ Soviet ȱ networks ȱ 1991 ȱ Azerbaijani ȱ independence ȱ 1994 ȱ The ȱ beginning ȱ of ȱ the ȱ exploration ȱ of ȱ the ȱ Azeri Ȭ Chirag Ȭ Gunashli ȱ fields(see ȱ above, ȱ Oil) ȱ 1999 ȱ Baku–Supsa ȱ opens ȱ 2006 ȱ BTC ȱ and ȱ SCP ȱ open ȱ 2008 ȱ Russia–Georgia ȱ war ȱ increases ȱ focus ȱ on ȱ alternative ȱ corridors ȱ 2017 ȱ Baku–Tbilisi–Kars ȱ (BTK) ȱ railway ȱ opens ȱ 2018 ȱ TANAP ȱ opens ȱ 2020 ȱ TAP ȱ opens; ȱ Azerbaijani ȱ gas ȱ reaches ȱ EU ȱ directly ȱ 2022–present ȱ Middle ȱ Corridor ȱ expansion ȱ accelerates ȱ amid ȱ changes ȱ in ȱ Eurasian ȱ trade ȱ patterns ȱ 2020–2023 ȱ End ȱ of ȱ the ȱ Nagorno Ȭ Karabagh ȱ war ȱ between ȱ Azerbaijan ȱ and ȱ Armenia ȱ ȱ L amonnaie revient au cœur des rapports de force inter­ nationaux. Selon Philippe Waechter, économiste en chef d’OstrumAsset Management, les récentes interventions américaines sur les marchés des changes mon­ trent que les devises deviennent des instruments d’influence et de puissance géopolitique. Après les droits de douane, Washington disposeraitainsid’unnouveaulevierpour agir sur ses partenaires et créer des rela­ tions de dépendance. Les taux de change neseraientdoncplusseulementdesvaria­ bles économiques, mais pourraient servir une stratégie internationale. Une économiemondiale plus fragmentée Pour Philippe Waechter, cette évolution s’explique par la fragmentation crois­ santede l’économiemondiale. Les règles communes et les mécanismes de coopé­ rationse sont affaiblis, laissant davantage de place à une confrontation entre grands blocs. Dans ce contexte, la mon­ naie peut devenir un instrument de dépendancepolitique. Un soutien finan­ cier ou monétaire peut ainsi créer une obligation implicite envers le partenaire. L’économiste cite notamment l’interven­ tion américaine concernant le peso argentin, qu’il interprète comme un moyen de renforcer la dépendance de l’Argentine à l’égard deWashington. Cette logique serait également visible dans les interventions américaines concernant leyen japonais et lewon sud­ coréen. Le 30 juillet 2026,Washingtonest intervenu sur le yen, officiellement dans un contexte de soutien à un pays allié. Le soutien apporté ensuite au won sud­ coréen renforcerait, selon Philippe Waechter, l’idée d’un système dans lequel l’aide monétaire peut s’accompa­ gner d’engagements réciproques. L’euro dans le rapport de force L’économiste relève également que l’in­ tervention américaine aurait été réalisée eneurosplutôtqu’endollars.Audelàdes considérations techniques, il y voit un message adressé à l’Europe : l’euro peut être utilisé comme un instrument dans une stratégie géopolitique qui n’est pas définie par la zone euro ellemême. L’analyse d’Ostrum repose sur l’émer­ gence de trois grands pôles économiques : les ÉtatsUnis, la Chine et la zone euro. Les pays gravitant autour de ces blocs pourraient voir leur monnaie se rappro­ cher de celle de leur puissance de réfé­ rence. Cette évolution pourrait réduire leur autonomie monétaire, accroître les risques pour la stabilité financière et ren­ dre le soutien extérieur plus stratégique. Pour l’Union européenne, cette évolution pose une question stratégique. Philippe Waechter estime que l’Europe ne peut plussecontenterdedéfendresasouverai­ netééconomiquedansunenvironnement où les monnaies deviennent des instru­ ments d’influence. Les taux de change devraient également être considérés comme un outil de projection écono­ mique et comme une composante de la politique étrangère européenne. La monnaie est ainsi redevenue un ins­ trument de puissance, dans un environ­ nement international où les rapports éco­ nomiques et géopolitiques sont de plus en plus étroitement liés. La monnaie redevient une arme géopolitique ©magnific